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Conventional wisdom in the economic analysis of tort law holds that 
legal errors distort incentives, causing behavior to depart from the 
optimum. If potential injurers know that courts err, they may engage 
in less or more than optimal precaution. This article revisits the effect 
of judicial error on the incentives of potential injurers by identifying a 
heretofore-neglected filtering effect of uncertainty in settings of 
imperfect judicial decision-making. We show that when courts make 
errors in the application of the liability standards, uncertainty about 
erroneous decision-making filters out the most harmful torts but 
leaves unaffected less harmful accidents. Our insight applies to various 
procedural and institutional aspects of legal adjudication, including 
the randomization of case assignment, the strength of precedent, and 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Legal indeterminacy has a bad reputation in the legal academy. 
Legal scholars fault legal uncertainty for undermining the rule of 
law and the legitimacy of the legal system.1 Economic 
scholarship highlights how uncertainty may raise the costs of 
litigation and erode the deterrent effect of the law.2 In the tort 
context, economic contributions have explained the various ways 
in which uncertainty distorts incentives to take care (Craswell 
and Calfee 1986; Shavell 1987), distinguishing across situations 
where sanctions increase gradually (Kahan 1989) and errors 
involving the application of rules or standards (Dari-Mattiacci 
2005).3 In light of these asserted costs of uncertainty, 
scholarship is preoccupied with increasing overall predictability 
in adjudication.4 
In this article we identify a novel, hitherto neglected, benefit 
of indeterminacy in adjudication. We extend the economic 
analysis of deterrence by considering the relationship between 
uncertainty and imperfect judicial decision-making.5 We show 
 
1 For an overview, see Johnson (1995). 
2 Outside of the tort law context, a few contributions have showed the ways in 
which uncertainty can have the virtuous effects of moderating issues relating 
to, for instance, excessive market power (Ayres and Klempeter 2004) and 
negotiations (Ayres and Talley 1995). 
 3 Additionally, a few recent contributions focus on the effect of factual and 
legal uncertainty on private utility instead of social welfare (Baker and 
Raskolnikov 2017; Raskolnikov 2017). 
4  See, for instance, in patent law, Lemley & Shapiro (2005). In the broader 
context of (in)determinacy of enforcement, of course, uncertainty has been 
pointed out to have desirable attributes, including the deterrent effect on risk-
averse offenders. For experimental evidence, see Baker et al. (2003). 
5 Note that there are different potential types of legal uncertainty. In this 
article, legal uncertainty implies that, for a given level of error, individuals do 
not know whether they will be subject an erroneous judicial decision (i.e. they 
do not know whether they will face a judge or court that makes an error or 
not). By contrast, Calfee and Craswell (1986) define a function F(x) which 
represents the relationship between a defendant’s level of care (x) and the 
probability of a fine (or penalty) being imposed. They interpret the standard 
deviation of F(x) as a measure of legal uncertainty.   
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that if tortfeasors cannot predict whether a court will make an 
error, this uncertainty in tort adjudication6 has a beneficial 
“filtering effect” on the frequency and types of accidents that 
occur in society.7 Specifically, we show how uncertainty about 
the incorrect application of liability standards prevents more 
harmful accidents while leaving unaffected less harmful 
accidents.  
The observation that, given judicial error, uncertainty may 
have a beneficial effect on deterrence, is an example of the 
Theory of Second Best—when there is a distortion (imperfect 
judicial decision making), adding a second distortion 
(uncertainty) does not necessarily increase the inefficiency. The 
intuition can be described as follows. Assume a distribution of 
judges that includes a fraction of judges that make inefficient 
decisions involving negligence.  Specifically, a fraction of judges 
excuses injurers even though the costs of prevention to the 
injurer are lower than the expected accident costs. This may 
happen because some judges do not apply the efficient tort 
standards, apply them incorrectly, or simply reject the efficient 
outcome because of ideological preferences.8  Generally, this 
possibility of a type II error (false acquittal) will result in 
underdeterrence if injurers know with certainty what type of 
judge will handle the case.   However, if there is uncertainty 
about the judge, injurers may nevertheless take care because the 
expected liability cost may still exceed the cost of care. The 
filtering occurs because uncertainty will be most effective in 
 
6  Filtering effects are not necessarily confined to a tort setting but could arise 
in any situation in which precautions can be taken to avoid harm (e.g. also in 
a contract setting).  
7 Filtering effects have previously been recognized in the context of sharing 
rules (Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest 2005). Our analysis identifies filtering in 
the more general setting of uncertainty. 
8 This section focuses on type II errors, but the model below will also take into 
account type I errors.  
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deterring those injurers who can avoid an accident at lowest 
cost—that is, those whose care is most efficient. 
A numerical example illustrates the filtering mechanism. 
Assume that there are three types of risk-neutral injurers, A, B, 
and C, who engage in a risky activity with the same frequency. 
Each injurer’s activity causes harm of 100 if no precaution is 
taken, but potential injurers can avoid harm with certainty by 
taking care.  However, the cost varies: for injurer A it costs 30, 
for injurer B the cost is 60, and for injurer C it is 90.  Thus, if no 
precaution is taken, the social loss is 70 for activity A, 40 for 
activity B, and 10 for activity C. Now consider an imperfect court 
system where judges fall into two categories. The first comprises 
judges who apply the Hand test correctly in determining the 
negligence standard, holding injurers liable only if the costs of 
precaution are less than the level of harm (100). Assume these 
“efficient judges” constitute 75% of the population. The 
remaining 25% of judges incorrectly excuse injurers as long as 
their precaution costs exceed 50 (half of the harm).  
Observe first that it is socially efficient for all injurers to take 
care in this example. However, if injurers know with certainty 
what type of judge they will confront, only type A injurers will 
take care all of the time, while both type B and C injurers will not 
take care if they know they will confront an inefficient judge.  
Expected social losses from these two types of injurers are 
therefore (.25)(40)=10 for type B’s, and (.25)(10)=2.5 for type 
C’s.  Total expected losses across the three types of injurers are 
therefore (0+10+2.5)/3=4.17. 
In reality of course, injurers do not always know with certainty 
what type of judge they will face or whether a court will apply an 
efficient rule or apply the rule correctly (for instance in a multi-
jurisdictional setting with diverse rules). If there is uncertainty 
among injurers about what type of judge they will face, expected 
liability from failing to take care is 75 (=.75×100), so both type A 
and type B injurers will now always take care, but type C will not. 
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Total losses in this case are therefore (0+0+10)/3=3.33. Overall 
losses are therefore reduced when there is uncertainty about 
judges because of the filtering effect—that is, conditions of 
uncertainty are more likely to deter more harmful behavior as 
compared to conditions of certainty.  
The filtering effect suggests that certainty about the efficient 
application of the legal rule is not always an improvement over 
situations where there is uncertainty. Of course, this finding does 
not imply that uncertainty is always preferable to certainty. Our 
model will show that the existence and magnitude of the filtering 
effect depends on the fraction of inefficient judges and on the 
severity of the errors by these judges. When the fraction of 
inefficient judges is relatively large and these judges' errors are 
relatively small, certainty is more efficient than uncertainty.9    
 The next section provides a formal model of this mechanism, 
and the following section discusses applications. 
 
2. THE FILTERING EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY: A FORMAL MODEL 
  Consider the following simple unilateral care accident model.  
Let H be the expected harm from an accident, and let c be the 
cost of care that avoids the accident altogether.10 While we 
assume that H is the same for all accidents, we suppose that 
injurers vary in their costs of care, and are distributed according 
to the density function q(c) over the interval [0,C], with C > H.  
For injurers with c ≤ H, it is efficient to take care, but for injurers 
with c > H, it is inefficient to do so. In the social optimum, in 
which the former type of injurers takes care and the latter type 
does not, total costs would be 
 
 
9 The model also shows the importance of the distribution of the type of 
injurers. In our example, if there are sufficiently more injurers of type C than 
of type B, the social loss will be lower under certainty. 
10 The model in this section involves discrete care choices by injurers.    










Assume that the assignment of liability is governed by a 
negligence standard.  Thus, when a case comes before a court, 
the judge must decide whether the injurer should be held 
responsible for the harm suffered by the victim.11 If the rule 
functioned perfectly, the efficient outcome would be achieved—
that is, only those accidents for which the precaution costs of the 
injurer are larger than the expected harm would actually happen. 
We assume, however, that the population of judges includes 
some who apply the Hand test with error.12  In particular, some 
"lenient" judges hold injurers not liable even if their costs of care 
are less than the harm. In other words, they commit type II 
errors.  At the same time, some other “strict” judges hold injurers 
liable even if their costs of care outweigh the harm. That is, they 
commit type I errors. Such departures from efficiency might 
result from simple computation errors in applying the negligence 
standard, or from judicial aversion to efficiency as the sole 
determinant of liability. For example, some judges may have 
ideological difficulties with the Hand test approach to the 
negligence rule and either excuse injurers even if their 
precaution costs are below the harm or hold them liable even if 
their costs exceed the harm.13    
We formalize the behavior of judges as follows. A fraction 𝑝! 
are lenient—i.e., they make errors by not holding injurers liable 
if their precaution costs exceed a given amount 𝐼! < 𝐻, whereas  
another fraction	𝑝" are strict—i.e., they hold injurers liable if 
 
11 We assume for simplicity that the victim himself cannot take any precaution 
and that all judges know the victim cannot take any precaution.  
12 We assume this distribution is exogenously determined. It does not depend 
on the level of certainty. In reality, the distribution could be endogenous.  
13 Some judges may, for instance, find that it would be unfair to oblige a 
relatively less wealthy injurer to compensate harm that was imposed upon a 
more affluent victim. Conversely, some judges may believe that strict liability 
should govern the assignment of responsibility for damages. 
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their costs are less than 𝐼" > 𝐻. We assume 𝐼" ≤ 𝐶. The 
remaining judges, comprising a fraction 1 − 𝑝! − 	𝑝", are 
efficient and hence do not make errors—i.e., they hold injurers 
liable if and only if their precaution costs are smaller than the 
true level of harm. Thus, injurers with 𝐼!< c < H wrongly escape 
liability if facing a judge who is too lenient, while injurers with H 
< c <	𝐼" are wrongly held liable if facing a judge who is too strict. 
Potential injurers must decide how much care to take in light of 
the likely accuracy of the courts. Assume two worlds with 
different degrees of uncertainty with regard to the application of 
the negligence rule. In a world of certainty, injurers know what 
type of judge they will face when making their care choice, 
whereas in a world of uncertainty, they do not know what type of 
judge will handle the case. 
 




  When potential injurers know the type of judge they will 
face, injurers who know they will confront a lenient judge will 
only take care if c ≤ I–.  Thus, injurers with I– < c ≤ H will refrain 
from taking care; this is the inefficiency arising from type 2 
errors.14  On the other hand, injurers who are aware that they will 
face either an efficient judge or a strict judge will make the 
efficient care decision; that is, they will take care if and only if c 
≤ H.  This is obvious for efficient judges.  It also applies to strict 
judges because, even though injurers with H < c ≤ I+ will be 
“wrongly” held liable, it is cheaper for injurers to refrain from 
taking care and just to pay the damages of H. From their 
perspective, it is as if the applicable rule is strict liability.  For this 
reason, type I errors do not result in inefficient behavior by 
 
14 Injurers with c>H will also refrain from taking care, but this is efficient. 
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injurers.15 16 Finally, injurers with I+ < c ≤ C will efficiently choose 
to refrain from taking care because they will not be found 
negligent by any judge.  Total costs in this case are 
 
15 The asymmetry between type I and type II errors in our model is a 
consequence of the assumption that judicial error involves the application of 
the negligence standard. If instead judges misestimate the amount of 
damages from an accident, H, then both types of errors would produce 
inefficient choices by injurers.  For example, if the true harm equals 100 but 
some judges believe it is 50, injurers with cost of care between 50 and 100 will 
inefficiently refrain from taking care (a type II error).  In contrast, if some 
judges believe the harm is 150, injurers with costs of care between 100 and 
150 will inefficiently take care (a type I error). In this context, filtering effects 
occur not only for type II errors but also for type I errors. Consider this 
following numerical example that focuses on type I errors. Suppose that 80 
percent of judges do not make errors (they believe the harm is 100), but 20 
percent of judges believe the harm is 150. Under uncertainty, an injurer with 
precaution costs between 100 and 110 will take precaution (if the injurer does 
not take care, the expected award equals 0.8x100+0.2x150=110), but an 
injurer with precaution costs between 110 and 150 will not.   
16 The filtering effect of uncertainty may also pertain in circumstances where 
judicial error about the negligence standard may induce over-deterrence. The 
following example, in which precaution does not entirely eliminate the 
accident loss, illustrates this. Suppose that an injurer must decide between 
two alternative precautionary measures (A and B). Prevention measure A 
costs 50 and is the socially optimal level of precaution. If the injurer selects A, 
the residual accident costs are 100. Instead, if the injurer selects precaution 
B, the residual accidents costs are 95. We distinguish between situations that 
involve relatively low precaution costs (B costs 60) and consequently 
relatively low social losses if the injurer takes too much care, on the one hand, 
and situations involving relatively high precaution costs (B costs 80) and 
relatively high social losses if the injurer takes too much care, on the other 
hand. Also, assume that 80 percent of judges take the efficient decision 
(demanding precaution A), and that 20 percent of judges make an inefficient 
decision (demanding precaution B as long as its cost is lower than e.g. 90). It 
follows that in the case of certainty, there is a 20 percent chance that due care 
will be set unambiguously at B. Injurers will engage in precaution B regardless 
of whether the cost is 60 or 80. If they take precaution A, they bear the 
residual accident costs of 100, which is a worse outcome for them. In other 
words, there is no differentiation between the case of high social losses and 
low social losses under a regime with certainty. Compare this to the outcome 
under uncertainty. When precaution costs are relatively low (B costs 60), the 
injurer will take too much care. If he does not engage in excessive care, the 
injurer’s expected costs will be 50 + 0.2x100=70. This exceeds the cost of 
precaution of 60 for B (if he takes B, no judge will find him negligent). When 
precaution costs are relatively high (B costs 80), the injurer will not take too 
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The social loss from the inefficient judges in this case is the 
difference between this expression and (1), or 
 





This represents the additional accident costs that result in those 
cases where injurers, knowing they would confront a lenient 
judge, fail to take care. 
 Now consider the case where injurers are uncertain about 
what type of judge they will face, though they know the 
probabilities of facing each type of judge.  If an injurer takes care, 
his or her costs will be c with certainty because no accident will 
occur, whereas if he or she does not take care, his or her costs 
depend on c.  First, all injurers with c ≤ I– will be held liable by 
all judges, so they will all take care. Second, all injurers with c > 
H will refrain from taking care no matter what judge they expect 
to face because whether or not they will be held liable, it is 
cheaper not to spend c.  Our interest is therefore on injurers with 
I– < c ≤ H.  These injurers will only be held liable by efficient and 
strict judges, which will happen with probability 1–p–.  Thus, 
injurers in this range will take care if c ≤ (1–p–)H and will not 
take care if the reverse is true.  If (1–p–)H < I–, there is no overlap 
between I– < c ≤ H and c ≤ (1–p)H. Consequently, under 
uncertainty, injurers with I– < c ≤ H never take care. In this case, 
the social loss is  
 






much care. Once again, if the injurer takes optimal precaution A, his expected 
costs equal 50 + 0.2x100=70. This is lower than the injurer's private costs 
when taking B (80). In conclusion, also in this situation a regime of 
uncertainty differentiates between situations of low and high social losses. 
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which is clearly larger than SLcert. Intuitively,  when(1–p–)H < I–
, injurers with precaution costs between  I– and H never take care 
under uncertainty, while these injurers still take care under 
certainty with a positive probability.      
 
 
Proposition 2:  If (1–p–)H > I– :  (i) uncertainty has a filtering 
advantage; (ii) the social loss is more likely to be lower under 
uncertainty than under certainty as	𝐼! decreases and as the 
proportion of injurers with relatively low (high) precaution costs 
increases (decreases); (iii) the influence of a change in p– on the 
difference in social loss depends on the distribution of 
precaution costs. 
 
Proof:   
 
(i) If (1–p–)H > I–, injurers with c ≤ (1–p–)H take care while those 
with (1–p–)H < c ≤C do not, resulting in total costs of 
 








which produces a social loss of  
 





The care by injurers over the range from I–  to (1–p–)H in this 
case represents what we referred to as the “filtering effect” of 
uncertainty.  It represents the social gain from uncertainty about 
judge types.  The necessary condition for this effect to be present, 
(1–p–)H > I–, can be rewritten as 
 




Thus, a filtering effect is more likely if: (a) the fraction of lenient 
judges (those who commit type 2 errors) is not too large; and (b) 




 , is significant.  In contrast, when the ratio  #
%
$
 approaches 1, 
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then certainty is preferable to uncertainty (see proposition 1). In 
many cases, expected harm is relatively easy to document or 
prove, and consequently the ratio will often be close to 1. 
However, when harm is difficult to prove and likely to be 
underestimated, e.g. because of fuzzy evidence or legal standards 
that exclude important elements of harm from consideration, or 
when judges are likely to deliberately underestimate harm due to 
bias, filtering effects are more likely.  
 
  
(ii) When (7) holds, the social loss is lower under uncertainty 
than under certainty if    
 
& (𝐻 − 𝑐)𝑞(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
)
(.%/!))






This condition is more likely to be fulfilled as: 
 
(a)  𝐼! (and thus #
%
$
 with H fixed) decreases: the partial derivative 
of the left-hand side of the inequality with respect to 𝐼! is zero, 
while it is negative for the right-hand side of the inequality 
(−𝑝!(𝐻 − 𝐼!)𝑞(𝐼!) < 0). In other words, the greater the 
departure of inefficient judges from the efficient Hand test, the 
higher is the likelihood that uncertainty will induce more 
efficient outcomes. The reason is that a decrease in I–/H raises 
the filtering advantage.    
 
(b)  the proportion of injurers with relatively low precaution 
costs (between 𝐼! and (1–p–)H)  increases, and the proportion of 
injurers with relatively high precaution costs (between (1–p–)H 
and H) decreases.  The explanation is straightforward. Injurers 
with precaution costs between 𝐼! and (1–p–)H take care under 
uncertainty (the lower bound of the integral on the left-hand side 
is	(1 − 𝑝!)𝐻), but they only do so with a probability of 1 − 𝑝! 
under certainty. And injurers with precaution costs between (1–
p–)H and H do not take care under uncertainty, but they do so 
with a probability of 1–p–  under certainty.  
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(iii) Taking the partial derivative of the social loss under 
uncertainty with respect to p– gives a value of p–H²q((1- p–)H). 
For the case of certainty, the partial derivative equals           ∫ (𝐻 −)&!
𝑐)𝑞(𝑐)𝑑𝑐.Clearly, the influence of p– depends on the distribution 
q(c).  
 
We now look at the case of a uniform distribution (𝑞(𝑐) ≡ 1/𝐶). 
 
 
Corollary 1:  For a uniform distribution, social loss is lower 






Proof:  For a uniform distribution, 
    























The social loss is lower under uncertainty if SLunc<SLcert, or if 
 




≡ 𝑝234% 																																																																																																													(10) 
 
Note that this puts a tighter upper bound on p– than (7).  
Condition (10) is more likely to be fulfilled as p– decreases. Also 
note, as discussed above for the general case, that this condition 
is more likely to be satisfied as I–/H decreases, holding p– fixed.  
Consequently, the filtering effect is strongest when there is a 
small fraction of judges who make relatively large errors, or who 
are intensely biased.  
 
As an illustration, Figure 1 graphs the relationship between 𝑝%&'!  
and I–/H. 
    
 





Graph 1. pI- max for different values of 𝐼!/H. 
 
Corollary 2:  For a uniform distribution, if the variance of 
𝐼! increases (holding the expected value constant), the 
desirability of uncertainty increases.  
Proof:  The reason can be observed in (8) and (9).  
Specifically, the convexity of (8) in 𝐼! implies that increasing the 
variance (risk) of 𝐼!, while holding its expected value constant, 
will cause the value of SLcert to rise.  In contrast, SLunc is not 
affected by the variance of 𝐼!  among lenient judges, but only 
depends on p-, the total fraction of those judges.  It follows that 
the social loss in a system of predictable judges increases because 
more injurers with relatively low precaution costs are not 
incentivized to avoid accidents—in other words, the filtering 
advantage of uncertainty increases.  
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An increase in the variance of 𝐼! could for example reflect 
greater variation in judicial ideology. To illustrate the effect of 
this increase in variance, we compare an example where 25 
percent of judges set a threshold for liability at 50, to one where 
12.5 percent of judges set a threshold of 25 and 12.5 percent set 
a threshold of 75.17  The “average ideology” therefore remains the 
same but the variance has increased. As illustrated by Graph 1, 
the social loss in the case of a single type of lenient judge is the 
same under certainty and uncertainty, and equals 3.125.18 
However, we can show that the example with greater judicial 
variance causes the loss under certainty to increase, while having 
no effect on the loss under uncertainty. Consequently, greater 
judicial variance increases the desirability of uncertainty. 
 To see this, we first compute the loss under certainty using 
(8), where 𝐼(! = 25, 𝐼)! = 75 and 𝑝(!	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑝)! = 0.125, such that 
𝑝(!𝐼(! +	𝑝)!𝐼)! = 50.  The result is 3.91>3.125. As for the loss 
under uncertainty, it turns out to be unaffected by the increase 
in judicial variance.  First, injurers with costs less than 25 will all 
take care.  Second, injurers in the range 25<c<75 will expect to 
be held liable with probability .825, making their expected 
liability from failing to take care 82.5, so all of these injurers will 
also take care.  Finally, injurers with c>75 will expect to be held 
liable with probability .75 and so face liability of 75. Thus, none 
of them will take care. But this is exactly the outcome in the 
example with a single type of inefficient judge.  The filtering 
disadvantage thus remains the same because what matters is the 
total number of “lenient judges,” which is unchanged. Only the 
variance increases. Thus, the social loss under uncertainty 
remains 3.125 in this example, which is lower than the losses 
under certainty. 
 
17 All other judges set a threshold of 100. 
18 We obtain this outcome by inserting p- = 0.25 and I- = 50 in either (8) or 
(9). 
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As a final note, it is worthwhile to point out an interesting link 
between focusing law enforcement and the level of 
certainty/uncertainty as it affects the filtering effect described in 
this article. Lando and Shavell (2004) develop the insight that 
there may exist an intrinsic advantage from focusing law 
enforcement effort on a subgroup of possible violators of law, 
rather than enforcing uniformly across the relevant population 
of potential violators. For example, they discuss the case in 
which it may be desirable for tax examiners to undertake more 
audits of individuals whose names begin with the letters A-M 
than of individuals whose names begin with N-Z.  This may be 
desirable even though the likelihood of tax violations is the same 
across the two groups. Intuitively, it may be the case that the gain 
in deterrence in the group for which enforcement effort is 
focused outweighs the loss in deterrence in the group for which 
enforcement effort is lowered. To illustrate, Lando and Shavell 
provide a numerical example in which each individual who files 
a tax return will obtain a benefit of $100 if he falsely claims a 
deduction and the penalty for making a false claim is $1,000. If 
tax examiners audit all individuals uniformly, the audit rate will 
be 6%. Consequently, given that the expected penalty will be only 
$60, all (risk-neutral) individuals will make false claims. The 
auditing will be ineffective. If, however, tax authorities announce 
that they will use their staff to audit half of the individuals (e.g. 
those whose names begin with A-M) with probability 12%, these 
individuals will be deterred from making false claims because of 
the expected penalty of $120. For half of the population, 
deterrence will rise from none to perfect. For the other half, the 
probability of an audit will decrease from 6% to 0%. However, 
deterrence will be unaffected (it remains at level zero). Hence, in 
this example, focusing law enforcement efforts on half of the 
population raises deterrence overall and is desirable.   
We can illustrate the effect of filtering in the context of this 
example by changing two aspects. First, if tax examiners audit all 
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individuals uniformly, the audit rate is 50 %. If they use their 
staff to audit half of the individuals, one half will face a 
probability of an audit of 100 %, and the other half faces an audit 
probability of 0 %. Second, suppose that the benefit of falsely 
claiming a deduction is not fixed at 100, but is uniformly 
distributed on the interval (0,100) for the entire population. As 
a result, the situation without focusing is similar to a situation 
with uncertainty, and only individuals with relatively large 
benefits (>50) will decide to falsely claim a deduction. The 
situation with focusing is one of certainty. Both groups know 
with certainty whether they will be audited or not. Individuals 
who know they will be audited all refrain from falsely claiming a 
deduction. Individuals who know they will not be audited will 
falsely claim a deduction, even if their benefit is very small. Thus, 
in this example, it may be preferable not to focus law 
enforcement. However, if most individuals would have a 
relatively small benefit of falsely claiming a deduction, focusing 
would be the preferred option. 
 
3. FILTERING IN CONTEXT: APPLICATIONS  
Although uncertainty is an inherent element of adjudication, 
institutional and procedural measures have a profound effect on 
the level of uncertainty in legal systems. In this section, we 
discuss three examples (randomization of adjudication, the 
strength of legal precedents, and the choice between rules and 
standards) in light of the filtering effect.  
 
3.1. Randomization in Adjudication 
Legal systems infuse uncertainty in adjudication by instituting 
randomization in adjudication. For instance, some circuits and 
states randomize the assignment of cases within courts. 
Randomization of case assignments is a key part of the case 
assignment procedure in many federal district courts, in the 
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federal courts of appeal, in many state trial courts and appellate 
courts, in federal immigration courts, and elsewhere.19 Of 
course, case assignment would be irrelevant to outcomes if all 
judges decided cases in an identical manner. As a factual matter, 
however, adjudicators vary in competence (the ability to achieve 
preferred goals) and ideology (the goals that are preferred by the 
adjudicator).20 Consequently, case assignment lotteries 
randomize the likely decisions and case outcomes in specific 
cases.  
To illustrate the filtering effect of randomization, consider the 
following numerical example involving case assignments. 
Assume that some adjudicators are more competent than others. 
The degree of randomness created by case assignment 
procedures may differ significantly. Randomness is complete 
when all cases are assigned by a lottery and all judges are in the 
same pool. Randomness is less than complete when the caseload 
is divided, say, into two parts such that the first caseload is 
assigned by lottery to the pool with the most competent judges, 
and the second caseload is assigned by lottery to the pool with 
the least competent judges. Assume further that injurers know 
ex-ante the pool of judges that they will be assigned to.21 Suppose 
30 % of judges are relatively inefficient: they excuse injurers if 
the precaution costs exceed 50. The remaining 70% of judges are 
more efficient: they only excuse injurers if the precaution costs 
exceed 75. If randomness in case assignment is complete, all 
 
19 For an example of randomization in case assignment, see the local rules of 
the Southern District of New York state: “All cases shall be randomly assigned 
by the clerk or his designee in public view in one of the clerk’s offices in such 
a manner that each judge shall receive as nearly as possible the same number 
of cases” (S.&E.D.N.Y.R.50.2(b)(2009)). Lotteries in case assignment affect 
perhaps millions of cases per year. See Samaha 2009. 
20 Cf. Posner 2008.  
21 Ex ante here is the moment when potential injurers decide how much care 
to take. This could be the case when each pool of judges deals with different 
types of cases (e.g. one group exclusively deals with commercial cases). 
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accidents with precaution costs lower than 70 will be avoided, 
but the rest will not be avoided.22  
Suppose further that the caseload is equally divided across all 
judges.23 That means that 30 % of cases are assigned to the more 
lenient judges, and 70% to the more efficient judges. In the first 
group of cases, accidents with precaution costs lower than 50 are 
avoided but the rest are not. In the second group, accidents with 
precaution costs lower than 75 are avoided, but the others are 
not. As this example illustrates, randomization of case 
assignment may increase uncertainty in a benevolent manner by 
capitalizing on the differences between efficient and inefficient 
decision-makers inside courts.  
 
3.2. The Strength of Precedent 
Legal systems generally differ with regard to the strength of 
precedent. In a strong precedent system, such as that applicable 
to U.S. Supreme Court decisions, judges are legally bound by 
prior judicial decisions. In a weak system of precedent, such as 
those found in many civil law jurisdictions, prior decisions 
provide valuable guidance but are not formally binding upon 
subsequent decision-makers.24  
The existing literature has revealed several benefits and costs 
of strong and weak precedent systems (Landes & Posner, 1976; 
 
22 We assume a weak system of precedent.  
23 This assumption is not necessary for our results, aligns with the goal of case 
assignment rules to allocate an even caseload across judges. 
24 Although the strictness of precedents is often noted as a major procedural 
difference between civil and common law jurisdictions, most legal systems are 
mixed systems of precedent. Theoretically, a line is drawn between the 
doctrine of stare decisis, which prescribes that courts adhere to past legal 
precedent on issues of law when deciding pending cases and the doctrine of 
jurisprudence constante, which hold that judges are bound only when a 
consolidated trend of decisions has already been established. Judicial 
decisions do not become a source of law until they mature into a prevailing 
line of precedents (Dainow 1974 and Dennis 1993). 
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Macey, 1998).25 This article adds a novel insight to the debate 
over the optimal strength of precedent. For litigants, the strength 
of precedent impacts the level of uncertainty in adjudication. A 
weak precedent system allows for greater levels of uncertainty. 
Contradicting rules may emerge from different cases, and 
potential injurers will select their care level by taking this mixed 
case law, with efficient and inefficient precedents standing side 
by side, into account. In a strong system of precedent, by 
contrast, the existence of an established precedent reduces (but 
of course does not fully eliminate) the level of uncertainty as to 
the case outcome.26 Once a precedent is set, potential injurers 
select their level of care on the basis of that precedent, regardless 
of whether it is efficient or inefficient.  
Consider for instance a setting where two alternative legal 
doctrines might apply to the behavior of a given type of agent 
with respect to her principal.  Each doctrine imposes a different 
duty of care, e.g. gross negligence versus ordinary negligence.27  
Suppose that the ordinary negligence duty is efficient. Under a 
strong precedent system, either the efficient doctrine (ordinary 
negligence) or the inefficient one (gross negligence) will become 
precedent. From there on, the agent is certain of the imposed 
duty of care. Under a weak precedent system, in contrast, both 
doctrines may co-exist. The agent will be uncertain as to which 
doctrine will be applied to her conduct in a given situation, and 
hence to what level of duty she will be held. 
Applying the analysis of the previous section, if judicial 
decision-making is imperfect, the uncertainty created by a 
weaker system of precedent benefits from the filtering effect 
described in the previous section.  As a result, a weak precedent 
 
25 For an overview of the literature to date, see Depoorter & Rubin (2017). 
26 A strict precedent system reduces the range of uncertainty by ascertaining 
the applicable determining rule, but of course does not affect the remaining 
uncertainty with regard to the application of the particular rule to the specific 
facts of the dispute.   
27 Of course, we could add other duties of care, e.g. a high trustee standard.   
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system may have an efficiency advantage over stronger forms of 
precedent when the filtering advantage (higher deterrence of 
very harmful behavior) is higher than the filtering disadvantage 
(lower levels of deterrence of less harmful behavior) and other 
costs associated with weak precedents. 
 
3.3. Rules versus Standards 
Courts or legislators also influence the degree of uncertainty 
whenever they adopt a new legal rule and must decide how they 
will formulate legal commands. When legislators and courts 
institute open-ended standards they increase the amount of 
decision-making at the judicial level as well as the range of 
possible outcomes and, consequently, the overall uncertainty. By 
contrast, when legislators and courts enunciate precise rules that 
enable mechanical decisions by judges, the overall degree of 
indeterminacy is likely to be narrower. 
Economic analysis treats the choice between rules and 
standards primarily as a trade-off between the ex-ante costs of 
norm specification and the costs of ex-post adjudication and 
administration (Schäfer 2006; Schwartz & Scott 1995). While 
open standards require more ex-post interpretation of the law by 
adjudicators, they offer additional flexibility to tailor outcomes 
to the specific context of the dispute (Erlich and Posner 1974). 
Our insight may add another dimension to the analysis of 
rules and standards. Specifically, our analysis suggests that the 
uncertainty associated with open-ended standards could 
possibly filter out more socially wasteful conduct. By contrast, in 
reducing the breadth of interpretative opportunities, precise 
rules reduce the degree of uncertainty while, in the process, 
forsaking the potential filtering of more socially wasteful 
conduct. 
Since there is no horizontal stare decisis, open standards at 
the federal level create the potential for circuit splits where 
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efficient and inefficient precedents can exist across states. 
Whenever the U.S. Supreme Court adopts open standards 
instead of bright line rules, it could in effect be enabling filtering 
effects for activities of defendants if, as a result, potential 
injurers cannot predict ex-ante what circuit they will be brought 
into. 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
Legal institutions and rules may differ to the extent that they 
introduce uncertainty in adjudication. Although reducing overall 
levels of indeterminacy in adjudication is an important goal of 
procedural reform, this article has suggested that adjudicative 
uncertainty can also have surprising virtues.  
Our analysis reveals how the presence of uncertainty impacts 
deterrence and, consequently, the occurrence of different types 
of accidents. When accounting for imperfect decision-making by 
courts, higher degrees of indeterminacy have a filtering effect: 
uncertainty prevents the most socially harmful behavior and lets 
less harmful behavior pass. By contrast, when there is relative 
certainty with regard to adjudication, there is no filtering of 
accidents across different levels of harm. We further 
demonstrated that filtering socially harmful accidents is more 
valuable when error rates and ideological variance among judges 
are high. 
Our hypothesis could be relevant to many issues of 
institutional design. For instance, our analysis identifies some 
insights that could be pertinent to randomizing adjudication, the 
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